DePaul Journal of Art, Technology
& Intellectual Property Law
Volume 19
Issue 1 Fall 2008

Article 2

Specialty Insurance for Intellectual Property: Additional Security
for Owners of Intellectual Property Assets
Todd M. Rowe

Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip

Recommended Citation
Todd M. Rowe, Specialty Insurance for Intellectual Property: Additional Security for Owners of Intellectual
Property Assets, 19 DePaul J. Art, Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 1 (2008)
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/2

This Lead Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Digital Commons@DePaul. It
has been accepted for inclusion in DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law by an authorized
editor of Digital Commons@DePaul. For more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu.

SPECIALTY
FOR
INTELLECTUAL
Rowe: SpecialtyINSURANCE
Insurance for Intellectual
Property:
Additional Securit
PROPERTY:
ADDITIONAL SECURITY FOR OWNERS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSETS
By Todd M. Rowe'
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Industrial Age presented a number of challenges as the
world moved from cottage industries to factories: "chimneys
caught fire, coals fell out of hearths, ovens and copper wash tubs
overheated when left alone by servants, tar kettles boiled over...
lids blew off sills, burning candles touched bed sheets and
curtains, and toppled into casks of oil and spirits or onto straw and
hay stables, hot ashes were thrown into back yards setting
household rubbish a light, and sparks from burning warehouses
blew across docks to set alight the rigging of ships." 2 These risks
gave rise to a market for fire insurance to protect property owners.'
Today, as we may be in the closing stages of the Industrial Age,
we have seen a significant decrease in number of tar kettles boiling
over and lids blowing off sills. However, while the risks may have
changed since the Industrial Age, the need for insurance has not.
While fire insurance was at one time a novel concept,
specialized insurance coverage for intellectual property assets is
becoming a more conventional need for many businesses.
Businesses, large and small, have started to take steps to protect
intellectual property, and, accordingly, a market has developed
specifically for insurance for intellectual property assets. This
article first analyzes issues related to coverage under Commercial
General Liability ("CGL") insurance policies for insurance for
intellectual property assets. Part II of this article briefly examines
the history of insurance coverage under the "Advertising Injury
Clause" found in CGL policies. 4 After providing a basic
1. Todd M. Rowe is an attorney with Tressler, Soderstrom, Maloney &
Priess, LLP in Chicago, Illinois where he specializes in insurance coverage.
2. ROBIN PEARSON, INSURING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: FIRE
INSURANCE IN GREAT BRITAIN, 1700-1850 1 (2004).
3.
See id.

4.

This article is not meant to provide an exhaustive analysis of the
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examination of the policy language and provide of the advertising
injury clause, Part II of this article contains an abbreviated review
of the how courts have construed the advertising injury clause
when analyzing coverage for intellectual property claims. In the
interest of brevity, Part II is not meant to be a comprehensive
analysis of the advertising injury clause. The question of whether
coverage under the advertising injury clause has been triggered is
dependent upon a number of variables that may be outside the
scope of this article. Additionally, an in-depth analysis of these
variables may be irrelevant to the extent that later generation CGL
policies have incorporated an exclusion expressly barring coverage
for intellectual property assets. Rather, this article is limited to an
overview of the inconsistent law related to coverage for
intellectual property assets in earlier versions of CGL policies and
the restrictive language of intellectual property exclusions found in
later versions of CGL policies.
One way to manage this inconsistency in insurance coverage for
intellectual property assets is to seek insurance coverage
specifically designed to protect intellectual property assets rather
than relying solely upon CGL policies. This article provides an
examination of insurance for intellectual property assets beyond
CGL policies and the scant law interpreting this insurance
coverage.' Specifically, Part III of this article provides an analysis
of the latest-generation of insurance coverage tailored specifically
for intellectual property. Part III provides support for the
conclusion that businesses with significant intellectual property
assets are best served by obtaining intellectual property insurance
in addition to CGL insurance.
Finally, this article concludes that while CGL coverage is
essential for every business, any businesses owning significant
intellectual property assets should obtain insurance coverage
specially tailored for intellectual property in addition to traditional
CGL coverage. CGL coverage only is no longer sufficient to
protect intellectual property. This article stresses that a business
advertising injury clause.

Rather, this analysis is meant to provide a basic

understanding of the advertising injury clause to intellectual property

practitioners.
5. The law related to intellectual property
undeveloped.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/2
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with significant intellectual property assets must compliment its
general liability coverage with intellectual property coverage.
II.

A.

INCONSISTENT RESULTS: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
ADVERTISING INJURY CLAUSE.

The Development of the Advertising Injury Clause in CGL
Policies.

For decades, business of all types and sizes have looked to the
commercial general liability policy for the lion's share of their
insurance needs.
Created in 1941 in response to a need for a 'general
purpose liability insurance policy' that any business
in the commercial market could use, the CGL is a
collection of standardized forms that have emerged
from the property and casualty insurance industry,
designed to allow carriers to assess risk in potential
policyholders and alter premiums accordingly.6
The insuring agreement in the typical CGL policy consists of
coverage for "bodily injury," "property damage" and "advertising
injury." Coverage A of the typical CGL policy is limited to
coverage for Bodily Injury and Property Damage. Coverage B of
the typical CGL policy is limited to Personal and Advertising
Injury Liability, which is commonly referred to as "the
Advertising Injury Clause." Over the years, the Advertising Injury
Clause has undergone a number of revisions. 7
These
developments have resulted in the following standard language for
the advertising injury clause: "We will pay those sums that the
insured becomes legally obligated to pays [sic] as damages
because of 'Personal Injury' or 'Advertising Injury'. . . . This
6. Jennifer S. Janik, Trademark Law and the CGL: The Race Between
Infringement Liability and its Reluctant Insurance Coverage, 10 CONN. INS. L.J.
171, 176 (2003).
7. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Steinberg, 393 F.3d 1226, 1231 n.2

(1 th Cir. 2004) (providing a concise history of advertising injury coverage).
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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insurance applies to 'advertising injury' . . . caused by an offense
committed... in the course of advertising your goods, products or
services." 8 Advertising injury means injury arising out of one or
more of the following offenses:
(a) Oral or written publication of material that
slanders or libels a person or organization or
disparages a person's or organization's goods,
products or services;
(b) Oral or written publication of material that
violates a person's right of privacy;
(c) Misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of
doing business;
(d) Infringement of copyright, title or slogan.9
Or, a policy may have a broadened definition to include the
following offense: "e. Infringement of trademark, copyright, title
or slogan.""°
Initially, the advertising injury clause was not part of the
Insuring Agreement of a standard CGL insurance policy."
Beginning in 1973, the Insurance Services Office ("ISO"), the
organization that publishes and drafts the standard-form CGL
policy language first introduced standard-form coverage for
"advertising injury." 2 Initially, advertising injury coverage was
only available through an endorsement to CGL policies. This
transition of the advertising injury clause from endorsement to
Coverage B of CGL policies has been succinctly stated as:

8.

6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS,

§ 33:5 (4th

ed. 1998).

9. Id.
10. Id. atn.10.
11. The 1973 Broad Form Endorsement excluded coverage for trademark
infringement. Id. § 33:5.

12. See Westfield Ins. Co. v. Factfinder Mktg. Research, Inc.., 860
N.E.2d 145, 149 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 8, §
33:5.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/2
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The "advertising and personal injury" coverage is
a relative newcomer to the CGL policy, having
been added by ISO when the CGL form was revised
in 1986. Before then, "advertising and personal
injury" coverage had been offered as part of the socalled Broad Form endorsement that many insureds
purchased but which was not a standard feature of
the policy. Today, bodily injury and property
damage claims are insured as Coverage A, whereas
"advertising and personal injury" claims are
insured as Coverage B. 3
In 1986, the ISO incorporated advertising injury coverage into
the main policy form and made significant changes to the coverage
by, among other things, introducing the four enumerated offenses
defining "advertising injury." 14 From that point forward, the
advertising injury clause was left virtually untouched until 1996,
when the ISO revised "a supplemental payment provision that
expanded coverage to benefit companies that would have an
obligation to indemnify other companies."15 The 1998 standard
form replaced the term "advertising injury" with the phrase
"personal and advertising injury."16 Also in 1998, the ISO
changed its definition of advertising injury clause from having an
offense for "infringement of copyright, title or slogan" to having
an offense for "infringing upon another's copyright, trade dress or
slogan in your 'advertisement.' 17 and defined "advertisement" in
the policy definitions as: "a notice that is broadcast or published in
the general public or specific market segments about your goods,
products or services for the purpose of attracting customers or
supporters." Finally, in 2001, an intellectual property exclusion
was added that barred coverage for "infringement of copyright,
13.

See JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN, APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW &
§ 3.09[2][c] (1981).
14. Broad Form Comprehensive General Liability Endorsement, GL 04
04 (ed. 3-81); see also, DAVID A. GAUNTLETT, INSURANCE COVERAGE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSETS, § 1.01 (A) (2008).
15. GAUNTLETT, supra note 14, § 1.01(C).
16. MCCARTHY, supranote 8, § 33:5.
17. Cent. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Stunfence, Inc., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1077
(N.D. Ill. 2003).
PRACTICE,
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patent, trademark or trade secret."
Based upon the modifications of the advertising injury clause
over the last three decades, coverage will only be triggered when
the injury is "caused by an offense committed in the course of
advertising [the insured's] goods, products or services" and the
injury must arise out of at least one of the specified enumerated
offenses. Despite what appears to be a rather simple grant of
coverage, the body of law interpreting the advertising injury clause
has produced inconsistent results. Moreover, there has been more
inconsistency as courts have increasingly been called upon to
interpret the advertising injury clause in the context of intellectual
property claims-that is, claims involving concepts that may be
unfamiliar to many courts that predominantly handle insurance
coverage litigation."
Acknowledging the inconsistent interpretations of the
advertising injury clause, one court commented "[a]n insurance
company's duty to defend intellectual property claims under the
rubric of 'advertising injury' is the subject of countless lawsuits indeed, a recent litigation explosion - throughout the country."' 9
"Advertising injury provisions have been part of the standard form
CGL insurance policy for many years, and a growing body of case
law has developed around claims that advertising injury provisions
provide coverage for intellectual property lawsuits, including
trademark and trade dress, patent, copyright, and trade secret
cases."" ° Recently, courts have adopted tests to determine whether
allegations in the underlying complaint trigger coverage under the
advertising injury clause.
18. The development of the Internet has spawned a number of new
questions related to insurance coverage for intellectual property that are outside
the scope of the present analysis. See e.g, Keith A. Dotseth & Johanna J.
Hillard, Sailing Uncharted Waters: Insurance Coverage for Intellectual
Property Disputes Arising from the Internet, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1125
(2002).
19. See Winklevoss Consultants, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 991 F. Supp. 1024,
1026 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
20. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. of Wis. v. Bradley Corp., 660 N.W.2d 666,
674 (Wis. 2003); see also GAUNTLETT, supra note 14, § 1.03 ("Decisions over
the last decade have reached mixed results, with courts often inappropriately
focusing on the labels of causes of action and not looking at how liability will
attach to the claims pled.").
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/2
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B.

JudicialTests To Determine Whether CoverageHas Been
Triggered Under the Advertising Injury Clause.

In an effort to limit this inconsistent, a number of courts have
adopted a "test" to determine if the advertising injury clause has
been triggered by a particular claim. One example of a court
adopting a test is seen in State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v.
Steinberg."' The Steinberg court stated there is a need for a test
because "courts have been called on to examine the applicability
of advertising injury clauses in CGL policies to an ever-expanding
array of underlying factual allegations and alleged torts based on
them, even as the standard CGL policy language has undergone
periodic revision by the Insurance Services Office ("ISO")." In
order to provide a uniform analysis of an "ever-expanding array of
underlying factual allegations," the Eleventh Circuit adopted the
following three-part test for coverage actions based upon the
typical CGL policy:
(1) the suit must have alleged a
advertising injury;

cognizable

(2) the infringing party must have engaged in
advertising activity; and
(3) there must have been some causal connection
between the advertising injury and the advertising
activity.2 2
A number of state and federal courts have adopted a similar test
while interpreting the advertising injury clause. Amazingly, courts
have reached varying results using virtually the same three-part
test. 23 In applying this three part test in Steinberg, the Eleventh
21.

State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Steinberg, 393 F. 3d 1226, 1230-31

(11 th Cir. 2004).

22.
23.

Id. at 1232.
Additionally, this test has been applied by a number of other courts.

See, e.g., Hyman v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 304 F.3d 1179, 1187 n.7
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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Circuit required that "[t]he insured's claim ...satisfy all three
prongs of the test for the court to hold that the insured has a duty to
defend and/or indemnify its insured."24 For example, the Eleventh
Circuit found the insured in Steinberg failed to meet the
requirements of the three-part test while attempting to establish
coverage under the advertising injury clause for an alleged
misappropriation of confidential client information. While the
Steinberg decision was based upon a claim for coverage for the
misappropriation of confidential client information rather than
traditional intellectual property infringement, it offers insight on
the mechanics behind this three-part test.2"
While providing an example of the mechanics of the three-party
test, the Steinberg decision also illustrates how litigants can read
ambiguity into the advertising injury clause in order to establish
insurance coverage despite a uniform analysis. Of course, it is
well-settled that "[i]f the language in the insurance policy is clear
and unambiguous, then it should be given its plain and ordinary
meaning, but if the language is ambiguous, the insurance contract
should be strictly construed against the insurance company."26 For
example, in Steinberg, despite the underlying claim being based
upon the misappropriation of customer lists, the insured argued
that the customer lists were akin to the misappropriation of trade
secrets and, therefore, constituted a "misappropriation of
advertising ideas or style of doing business" that would have
triggered coverage under the advertising injury clause. After an
extensive analysis of whether customer lists trigger coverage under
the advertising injury clause 27 , the Eleventh Circuit held "[a]
(11 th Cir. 2002); Elan Pharm. Research Corp. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 144
F.3d 1372 (1lth Cir. 1998).
24. Steinberg, 393 F.3d at 1232.
25. The Eleventh Circuit ultimately rejected the insured's position in
Steinberg that allegations of stealing customer lists constituted an "infringement
of copyright, title or slogan" under the insured's CGL policy. See id.
26. See, e.g., Officer v. Chase Ins. Life & Annuity Co., 541 F.3d 713,
715 (7th Cir. 2008).
27. The Eleventh Circuit's analysis was driven by the fact that "[a]mong
federal appellate courts, only the Ninth Circuit has specifically addressed the
applicability of the 'misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing
business' clause in a CGL policy's advertising injury coverage for a lawsuit
alleging misappropriation of a customer list and other confidential information."
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/2
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confidential customer list is a trade secret, not an idea about
advertising or an outward expression of a business's style. 28
Consequently, in finding that the misappropriation of customer
lists was not an "infringement of copyright, title or slogan" or "a
misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business,"
the Eleventh Circuit found "the Steinberg defendants fail the first
prong of the three-part test ...[and] we need not reach the second
and third prongs. '"29

The Steinberg decision illustrates the ambiguity that may arise
in the advertising injury clause under circumstances where the
underlying claim does not involve the complexities seen in claims
of patent, trademark or copyright infringement. The flaws with the
three-part test become more prevalent when the underlying
Steinberg, 393 F.3d at 1233. The Eleventh Circuit cited a Ninth Circuit case for
the proposition that
the insurer had a duty to defend its insured under the
"misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of
doing business" clause where the underlying
complaint alleged that the insured had induced a third
party to breach a non-competition agreement with the
underlying plaintiff company, to misappropriate its
"trade secrets, including customer lists, marketing
techniques, and other inside and confidential
information" and, together with the insured, to solicit
the underlying plaintiffs customers.
Id. (citing Sentex Sys., Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 93 F.3d 578,
581 (9th Cir. 1996). However, the same year it decided Sentex, moreover, the
Ninth Circuit rejected a coverage claim under the "misappropriation of style of
doing business" clause for a suit alleging theft of trade secrets that did not arise
in the course of advertising activities. See Simply Fresh Fruit, Inc. v. Cont'l Ins.
Co., 94 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 1996). While not on point, the Eleventh Circuit also
cited to a Third District decision for its reasoning supporting its conclusion that
"[t]he allegation that[the insured] engaged in unfair competition by
misappropriating trade secrets relating to manufacture of a product line does not
allege misappropriation of advertising ideas or styles of doing business as such."
See Steinberg, 393 F.3d at 1234 (quoting Frog, Switch & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 742, 748 (3d Cir. 1999)) (alterations in original).
28. Steinberg, 393 F. 3d at 1234. Additionally, the Steinberg court found
the reasoning in Winklevoss Consultants,supporting the holding that trade secret
misappropriation did not constitute "infringement of title," to be persuasive.
Steinberg, 393 F.3d at 1232 (citing Winklevoss Consultants, Inc. v. Fed. Ins.
Co. 991 F. Supp. 1024, 1040 (N.D. Ill. 1998)).
29. Steinberg,393 F.3d at 1234.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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allegations related to patent, trademark or copyright infringement.
That is, insurance companies and owners of intellectual property
have minimal guidance as courts have rendered inconsistent
findings on each prong of the three-part test. The following will
examine the conflicting results under each prong of the three-part
test:
1. The FirstProng Of The Three-Part Test: The Suit Must Have
Alleged A Cognizable Advertising Injury.
This first prong of the three-part test requires the underlying
pleading to contain allegations of an "advertising injury" as that
term is defined in the policy at issue. "The touchstone for
determining whether [an underlying] complaint has alleged an
advertising injury is the enumerated offense in the insurance
policy."3 The latest generation of CGL Policies defined the term
"advertising injury" as requiring at least one of the following
"offenses:"
(a) Oral or written publication of material that
slanders or libels a person or organization or
disparages a person's or organization's goods,
products or services; (b) Oral or written publication
of material that violates a person's right of privacy;
(c) Misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of
doing business; or (d) Infringement of copyright,
title or slogan. 3
The question as to whether an insured meets this first-prong
typically hinges upon whether the underlying complaint contains
allegations of an insured's conduct that would constitute an
"offense." This question is left entirely to a court's interpretation
of the allegations in the underlying complaint and the offenses
identified in the policy at issue. Understandably, this first prong
has spawned a fair amount of controversy.
30. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. of Wis. v. Bradley Corp., 660 N.W.2d 666,
675 (Wis. 2003).
31. Westfield Ins. Co. v. Factfinder Mktg. Research, Inc., 860 N.E.2d
145 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/2
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For example, in Fireman'sFund Insurance Co. of Wisconsin v.
Bradley Corp.,32 the Wisconsin Supreme Court found the
advertising injury clause was triggered based upon the "reasonable
inference" that the underlying complaint had allegations that
constituted an offence under the advertising injury clause.
Specifically, the insurance policies at issue in Bradley defined the
term "advertising injury" as "injury arising out of
[i]nfringement of trademark, copyright, title or slogan."33 The
insured in Bradley sought coverage based upon an underlying
complaint devoid of the terms trademark, trade dress, copyright or
patent. The Bradley Court opined "[i]t is not dispositive that the
specific words 'trademark' and 'trade dress' are not included in the
complaint or that neither the complaint nor Bradley identifies a
single distinguishable, non functional feature of the [alleged
infringing product] that could be the subject of a trade dress
claim."34 Under a cause of action entitled "Federal Unfair
Competition," the underlying plaintiff sought redress for an
alleged violated section 43 of the Lanham Act.35 More precisely,
the underlying plaintiff sought damages based upon allegations of
"Bradley's misappropriation of. . ."Trade Secrets, technologies and
designs relating to" the infringing product. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court found the allegations, which were related to
misappropriated "trade secrets, technologies and designs,"
arguably constituted trade dress infringement, and, therefore,
triggered coverage under the subject policy.

32. 660 N.W.2d 666 (Wis. 2003).
33. Id. at 674.
34. See id. at 677.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006). The Wisconsin Supreme Court analyzed
the underlying claim:
Section 43 of the Lanham Act was designed to create
a new federal remedy for the particular kind of unfair
competition that results from false designation of
origin or other false representation used in
connection with the sale of a product. The key to
finding a violation under § 43 "is a determination that
the materials used by the defendant created a
likelihood of confusion, deception or mistake on the
part of the consuming public."
See id.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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Finding coverage in Bradley required multiple steps in order to
transform an unfair competition claim into a trade dress
infringement claim. The advertising injury clause at issue in
Bradley did not include "Federal Unfair Competition" as an
offense. Nevertheless, the Bradley court found coverage had been
triggered because the Lanham Act provides the statutory
framework for both a cause of action for Federal Unfair
Competition and trade dress infringement. Therefore, the Bradley
court found coverage because unfair competition and trade dress
infringement trace their origins back to the same statutory
framework, the Lanham Act. Irrespective of whether the holding
in Bradley was correct, there is no dispute that there is a certain
level of uncertainty as to what the advertising injury clause would
cover based upon the Wisconsin Supreme Court's interpretation.
For example, it is doubtful that an insurance broker would be able
to confidently tell a client there is coverage under an advertising
injury clause that provides coverage for trademark infringement
used in an insured's advertising for Federal Unfair Competition
claim based upon the client's advertising.
2. The Second Prong Of The Three-PartTest: The InfringingParty
Must Have Engaged In An Advertising Activity.
The second-prong of the three-part test requires the insured
engaged in "advertising activities. This second-prong focuses on
the insured's advertising with an examination of whether the
alleged "advertising injury" was "committed in the course" of an
insured's advertisements or "advertising activities." Remarkably,
there is even a disagreement concerning whether the term
"advertising" needs to appear in the underlying pleading in order
to trigger coverage under the advertising injury clause. "For
purposes of an 'advertising injury' coverage provided under
commercial general liability and catastrophic liability policies, the
specific mention of the word 'advertising' in pleadings in the
underlying action is not indispensable to a finding that an insurer
has a duty to defend."36 It is overly optimistic to hope for clarity
when courts have actually found ambiguity in the word
36. 14 LEE R. Russ & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE, §
201:53 (3d ed. 2008).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/2
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"advertising."
Unlike the term "advertising injury," most, if not all earlier CGL
policies will not contain a definition for "advertising" or
"advertising activity."37 Lacking any policy language, a number of
courts rely on the ordinary meaning of "advertising" which can
typically found in the dictionary. However, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in Acuity v. Bagadia examined whether Wisconsin
courts should adopt the broad or narrow definition of
"advertising."38 Simply, the inconsistent interpretations of the
advertising injury clause are not surprising when courts are able to
craft multiple definitions of the term "advertising."
Nevertheless, there was no dispute that the insured in Acuity met
the first-prong of the three-prong test seen in Steinberg. UNIK,
the insured in Acuity, was described as a vendor that sold computer
software at discount prices, sought coverage for a judgment taken
against it by Symantec Software in the United States District Court
of Oregon. More precisely, the District Court granted Symantec's
motion for summary judgment holding the insured "among other
actions, advertised, distributed, and sold Symantec's copyrighted
and trademarked products without authorization. Symantec also
alleged that UNIK's actions caused injury to Symantec, including
consumer deception and confusion."39 The District Court found
the insured's placed Symantec trademarks and products in the
insured's advertising and unlawfully sent its customers Symantec's
products.4" Simply put, the District Court found the insured
violated Symatec's copyrights and trademarks.
Acuity filed a declaratory judgment action in Wisconsin to
determine whether it had a duty to defend its insured against
Symantec's allegations. After the Wisconsin Supreme Court
found the insurance policy at issue provided coverage for both
copyright infringement and trademark infringement, the Court

37. Recently, CGL policies have started to define the term "advertising."
See, e.g., Kreuger Int'l v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 07-C-0736, 2008 WL 4962669, at
*2 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 19, 2008) (where the policy at issue defined "advertising" as
"attracting the attention of others by any means for the purpose of seeking
customers or increasing sales or business").
38. See Acuity v. Bagadia, 750 N.W.2d 817, 827 (Wis. 2008).
39. Id. at 820.
40. See id.

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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addressed the dispute between the insured and insurer in Acuity
regarding whether "advertising" should be narrowly or broadly
defined.4'
Specifically, the Acuity court, citing the Bradley
decision, noted the two following definitions for "advertising":
"[t]he standard narrow definition is: 'widespread announcement or
distribution of promotional materials.'
The standard broad
definition is: 'any oral, written, or graphic statement made by the
seller in any manner in connection with the solicitation of
business."' 42 Adhering to the principle that ambiguous policy
language should be construed in favor of coverage, the Aquity
court adopted the broad definition of advertising.
Next, the Acuity court applied the broad definition of advertising
to the allegations found in the underlying complaint. First, as to
the copyright infringement allegations, the Acuity court found the
insured "infringed Symantec's copyrights by distributing sample
disks containing Symantec's copyrighted . . .software without
Symantec's authorization."43 The Wisconsin Supreme Court
found the insured's copyright infringement involved "advertising
activities" because supplying samples-which infringed upon
Symantec
copyrights-to
potential
buyers
constituted
advertising."
Second, as to the trademark infringement
allegations, the District Court of Oregon found the insured
"distributed ...disks containing computer software denoted by
Symantec's trademarked names and when it used Symantec's
trademarked names in print advertising."45 The Acuity court found
the insured's conduct constituted advertising as "[t]he magazine
advertisements contained in the record show Symantec's
trademarked name.
[The insured's] placing advertisements
bearing Symantec's trademark constitutes a 'graphic statement
made by the seller in any manner in connection with the
solicitation of business."46
The Seventh Circuit in Zurich Insurance Co. v. Amcor Sunclipse
41. See id. at 828.
42. Id. (quoting Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. of Wis. v. Bradley Corp., 660
N.W.2d 666, 679 (Wis. 2003)) (citation omitted).
43. See id. at 824.
44. See Acuity, 750 N.W.2d at 829.
45. See id. at 824.
46. Id. at 830 (quoting Bradley, 660 N.W.2d at 679).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/2
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North America, narrowed coverage under the advertising injury
clause even further in finding that:
[r]ecent years have witnessed a surge of claims that
one or another breach of contract or business tort
that to a normal reader has nothing to do with
advertising nonetheless should be classified as
"advertising injury" [under the typical CGL policy].
Interpreting the law of all three states in [the
Seventh Circuit], and of several others too, we have
held that advertising-injury clauses should be given
an ordinary-language reading, the one that parties
likely supposed they were achieving when
negotiation this language.47
The Amcor Sunclipse decision is premised upon the reasoning
that "[a]dvertising is a subset of persuasion and refers to
dissemination of prefabricated promotional material."48 In further
support of its determination, the Seventh Circuit held that
decisions which have construed the advertising injury clause
provide minimal authority in determine whether there is coverage
for certain claims.
As seen from the above-cited decisions, there is great
uncertainty over whether the term "advertising" should be broadly
or narrowly interpreted. Once again, an insurance broker would
not be advised to promise a client that a particular court would
adopt the broad or narrow view of "advertising." Simply, the
current state of the law related to this second-prong fails to provide
insurers or owners of valuable intellectual property rights with
sufficient certainty.
3. The Third Prong Of The Three-Part Test: There Must Have
47. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Amcor Sunclipse N. Am., 241 F. 3d 605, 607 (7th
Cir. 2001) (citing W. States Ins. Co. v. Wis. Wholesale Tire, Inc., 184 F.3d 699
(7th Cir. 1999); Erie Ins.Group v. Sear Corp., 102 F.3d 889 (7th Cir. 1996);
Curtis-Universal, Inc. v. Sheboygan Emergency Med. Servs., Inc., 43 F.3d 1119
(7th Cir. 1994); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 769
F.2d 425, 428-30 (7th Cir. 1985)).

48.

See id.

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016

15

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 2

16

DEPAUL J. ART, TECH & IP LAW

[Vol. XIX: I

Been Some Causal Connection Between The Advertising Injury
And The Advertising Activity
If the definitions of "advertising injury" and "advertising" can
cause confusion then it should be no surprise that something as
abstract as the "causal connection" between the insured's
advertising and the alleged injury has produced inconsistent
authority. The third-prong of the test hinges upon whether there is
a causal nexus-that is, the connection between the allegations in
the "offense" and the insured's advertising activities. Courts have
disagreed as to how strong the "causal connection" must be in
order to trigger coverage under the advertising injury clause.
Suffice it to say, there is a substantial body of law related to the
causal connection requirement for the advertising injury clause.
First, there is authority requiring a strong causal connection. The
Sixth Circuit in Advance Watch Co. v. Kemper NationalInsurance
Co. provides the seminal decision requiring a strong connection by
holding that advertising injury clause cannot be triggered when
there is nothing more than "some nexus between the ground of
asserted liability and the insured's advertising activities." " The
Advance Watch decision established the sufficiently strong causal
nexus to preclude coverage under the advertising injury clause
being triggered "whenever an advertised product or service is
alleged to have caused harm, rendering the coverage applicable
with respect to most claims against an insured business.""
The reasoning that supports the requirement of a
causal connection is clear and persuasive: "Taken to
its extreme, [the argument that no causal
relationship is necessary] would lead to the
conclusion that any harmful act, if it were
advertised in some way, would fall under the grant
of coverage merely because it was advertised."'"

49. Advance Watch Co. v. Kemper Nat'l Ins. Co., 99 F. 3d 795, 806 (6th
Cir. 1996).
50. Id..
51. Bank of the W. v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County, 833 P.2d
545 (Cal. 1992) (quoting Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Siliconix, Inc., 729 F.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/2
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The strong causal nexus in the Advance Watch translates into a
stringent requirement that the advertising directly cause the injury.
[I]t was not [the insured's] advertising in itself
which provoked [the suing plaintiffs] claim; it was
the fact that in each advertisement ... there was [a
product] deceptively similar in shape and
appearance to [those of the suing plaintiff].
[I]t is the shape and appearance [of the
insured's products that were] claimed to have
caused injury.52
Secondly, there is authority requiring a weaker causal
connection: "Advance Watch has been sharply criticized for
ignoring the real contours of intellectual property litigation, which
often proceeds under a bewildering variety of different labels
covering the same material facts."53 One such requirement is seen
v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., decided in
in R.C. Bigelow, Inc
54
the Second Circuit.
The insured in Bigelow, a manufacturer/distributor of herbal
teas, was accused of trade dress infringement, false advertising,
unfair competition, and trade dress dilution, and for a cause of
action arising under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.55 The trade
dress claim was based upon allegations that "Bigelow introduced
its herbal teas in new packaging with trade dress confusingly
similar to that of [its competitors] boxes."56 Bigelow sought
coverage for these claims under the advertising injury clause of its
CGL policy issued by Liberty Mutual. 7 Specifically, Bigelow
asserted there was coverage because the alleged trade dress
infringement constituted the offense for "[c]opying a person's or
Supp. 77, 80 (N.D. Cal. 1989)) (alteration in original).
52. Advance Watch, 99 F.3d at 806-07.
53. See Frog, Switch & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 742, 747
(3d Cir. 1999).
54. R.C. Bigelow, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 287 F.3d 242 (2d Cir.
2002).
55. Id. at 244.

56.
57.

Id.
See id.
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organization's advertising ideas or advertising style" under the
Liberty policy. 8 Liberty took the position that the trade dress
claims fell outside the advertising injury clause and declined
coverage. "
In finding the allegations triggered coverage under the CGL
policy issued by Liberty, the Second Circuit in Bigelow opined:
Decisions such as Advance Watch appear to have
considered the claim against the insured rather
narrowly as limited to the initial act of copying the
claimant's trademark or trade dress, rather than
more broadly as encompassing the continuing
creation of consumer confusion by displaying the
allegedly similar mark or dress in advertising. The
continuing nature of trademark and trade dress torts
has been widely recognized.6
Consequently, the central issue in the Bigelow decision was
"where an advertising injury is alleged, the relevant causation
issue with regard to insurance coverage is not whether 'the injury
could have taken place without the advertising,' but 'whether the
advertising did in fact contribute materially to the injury."'61
Using this standard, the Bigelow court found Bigelow's
advertisements containing the allegedly infringing packaging
"creat[ed]consumer confusion by the use of copied trade dress."62
Conversely, the Seventh Circuit in Western States Insurance Co.
v. Wisconsin Wholesale Tire, Inc. denied coverage under the
advertising injury clause based upon a finding that there was no
harm caused by the advertising at issue. 63 The Seventh Circuit
opined:
An "advertising injury" clause operates only when
58. Id. at 245.
59. Id.
60. See Bigelow, 287 F.3d at 248.
61. See id.
62. Id. at 249.
63. W. States. Ins. Co. v. Wis. Wholesale Tire, Inc., 184 F. 3d 699, 703
(7th Cir. 1999).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/2

18

Rowe: Specialty Insurance
for Intellectual Property: Additional Securit
SPECIALTY

INS. FOR IP

2008]

there is something wrongful about the advertising..
. . Any other approach would lead a fairly narrow

clause to coverage almost every injury connected
with a business operation, a conclusion... thought
implausible. Citing and following cases from many
other jurisdictions, Diversified Investments held that
only when advertising is an independently tortuous
source of injury does the "advertising injury" clause
supply coverage.'
Acknowledging the hazard in allowing the advertising injury
clause from being interpreted too broadly, a number of courts have
required the advertising to not only be wrongful in and of itself,
but also must cause the alleged loss. For example, in Tradesoft
Technologies, Inc., the Superior Court of New Jersey held "in
order to invoke the coverage of the policy, the advertising
activities must cause the injury-not merely expose it." 65
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in Microtec Research, Inc. v.
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. held that allegations that would
be considered to be related advertising would give rise to coverage
under the advertising injury clause. 66 The insured in Microtech
Research was sued for passing off computer software as though it
had created the software.67 The underlying complaint contained
words "such as 'marketing,' 'threatened that reputation,' and
'representing' which seem, if taken in isolation, to suggest a claim
for advertising injury. But read in context, they do not."68 Based
upon this reasoning, the Ninth Circuit found there was no coverage
for the allegations in the underlying complaint because "[t]he harm
...is allegedly caused by the misappropriation of the [computer
software], not by the advertising itself."69
64. Id. at 703 (citing Diversified Invs. Corp. v. Regent Ins. Co., 596
N.W.2d 502 (Wis. 1999)).
65. Tradesoft Techs., Inc. v. Franklin Mut. Ins. Co., 746 A.2d 1078, 1087
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (quoting Simply Fresh Fruit, Inc. v. Cont'l Ins.
Co., 94 F.3d 1219, 1223 (9th Cir. 1996)).
66. Microtech Research, Inc. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 968

(9th Cir.
67.
68.
69.

1994)
Id. at 970.
Id. at 971.
See id.
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The "causal connection" requirement makes it nearly impossible
for the owner of intellectual property rights or an insurance carrier
to determine whether proper insurance coverage has been obtained
without obtaining a judicial determination on the issue. The causal
connection-regardless of whether a court requires a strong or
weak connection-makes the CGL policy an impractical choice
for an insured seeking to protect intellectual property rights.
However, the advertising injury clause remains a near essential
form of protection for any business that advertises.
C. Exclusions In CGL Coverage For Intellectual PropertyClaims
Recently, CGL policies have become more restrictive by
expressly excluding claims related to insurance coverage. The
issues presented by the "causal connection" will eventually
become irrelevant, as more recent policies will include intellectual
property exclusions. Nevertheless, the analysis of the causal
connection is still important to the extent that some insurers are
slower to adopt the language of ISO forms and claims will still be
made under the earlier versions of CGL policies. Ultimately,
claims for intellectual property under CGL coverage should
become virtually non-existent.7" The newer CGL policies have
added intellectual property exclusions barring coverage under the
following circumstances: 7
Intellectual property. We won't cover injury or
damage that results from any actual or alleged
infringement or violation of any of the following
rights or laws:
" Copyright.
*

Patents.

70. See William F. Campbell, New Policies, Less Coverage: Insurance
Coveragefor Intellectual Property Claims, 22 No. 3 INTELL. PROP. L. NEWSL.
13, 13 (2004).
71. See Kreuger Int'l, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., No. 07-C-0736, 2008 WL
4962669, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 19, 2008).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/2
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* Trade dress.
* Trade name.
*

Trade secret.

*

Trademark.

*

Other intellectual property rights or laws."

At present, there is scant authority concerning how courts will
interpret and apply this exclusion.73 In one of the more recent
cases involving the intellectual property exclusion, Kreuger
International,Inc. v. FederalInsurance Co., the District Court for
the Eastern District of Wisconsin did not have to address this
exclusion because the court found the allegations in the underlying
complaint did not trigger the advertising injury clause.74
Importantly, the intellectual property exclusion in Kreuger
contains an exception for "advertising injury that results from
unauthorized use of any copyrighted or trademarked advertising
material, slogan, style, or title of others in your advertising."75
Essentially, this exception creates coverage for copyrights and
trademarks used in advertising. While the usage of copyrights and
trademarks that will be covered is limited to use in advertising, this
exception to the exclusion may provide the fuel for a litigant to
argue the exception is ambiguous.
72.

The ISO exclusion in the 2001 coverage form bars coverage for:
i.Infringement Of Copyright, Patent, Trademark Or
Trade Secret
"Personal and advertising injury" arising out of the
infringement of copyright, patent, trademark, trade
secret or other intellectual property rights.
However, this exclusion does not apply to
infringement, in your "advertisement" of copyright,
trade dress or slogan.
73. See, e.g., NGK Metals Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., No. 1:04CV-56, 2005 WL 1115925 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 29, 2005); Greenwich Ins. Co. v.
RPS Prods. Co., 882 N.E.2d 1202 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
74. See Kreuger, 2008 WL 4962669, at *12.
75. See id. at 3.
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The decisions in Finn v. National Union Fire Insurance of
Pittsburgh, a Massachusetts court recently held "the plain
language of the intellectual property exclusion unambiguously
precludes coverage." 76 While the exclusion at issue in Finn was in
a professional liability policy rather than a CGL policy, this
decision is still instructive. The Finn court was called upon to
construe an exclusion barring coverage for "any claim arising out
of any misappropriation of trade secret."77 The Finn court further
noted "[a] more difficult issue is whether the injury suffered...
arose out of [a] misappropriation

of

.

.

. trade secrets."7 "

Specifically, the insured in Finn took the position that the alleged
damages "(consisting primarily of foregone legal fees) are not the
sort of damages normally sought in a misappropriation claim and
consequently the requisite causal connection between the
prohibited conduct and injury is lacking."79 While the Finn court
opined "[the insured's] argument has some force, there is no
indication in the record on appeal that [the insured would have
allegedly caused] any loss in the absence of the [alleged]
misappropriation."8 While the court held the claim arose out of
the alleged misappropriation of trade secrets and was excluded
from coverage, the insured's argument is indicative that there still
may be a significant amount of litigation related to the intellectual
property exclusion. The case law related to this exclusion is still
undeveloped.
D. UncertaintyRelated To The Advertising Injury Clause For
Intellectual PropertyClaims.
The advertising injury clause has strayed into decisions related
to intellectual property claims that have little or nothing to do with
advertising. The following offers examples of the awkward fit
between the advertising injury clause and the protection of
intellectual property rights.
76. Finn v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 896 N.E.2d 1272,
1278 (Mass. 2008).

77.
78.
79.
80.

See id. at 1274.
Id. at 1279.
Id. at 1279.
Id.
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1. CopyrightInfringement
Copyright law protects literary works, musical works, dramatic
works, pantomimes and choreographic works, pictorials, graphic
and sculptural works, motion pictures and other audiovisual works,
sound recordings and architectural works. 8' It is entirely possible
to have a viable copyright infringement claim without any
advertising whatsoever. Therefore, it should be a rather simple
analysis whether the advertising injury clause is triggered by a
claim of copyright infringement. For instance, advertising injury
coverage may be triggered where there are allegations of the use of
a copyrighted work in the insured's advertising. That is, there may
be allegations that the advertisements caused the injury and the
copyright infringement is nothing more than a supporting
character. Unfortunately, it has not been that simple.
For example, commentators have described coverage for
copyright infringement under the advertising injury clause in the
following manner:
there are essentially two standards for coverage
commonly appearing in CGL policies: one for
copyright infringement in advertising and the other,
older language for copyright infringement
committed in the course of advertising. Almost all
of the available case law focuses on the older
language, but it seems that the newer language is, at
least on its face, intended to be more restrictive.
This change could adversely affect insureds seeking
to establish a duty to defend-a requirement that
the infringement be "in" the advertisement could
make it harder to hinge defense costs on the
"potential for coverage."82

Recent court decisions offer examples of court's requiring more
than mere allegations of copyright infringement to trigger
coverage under the advertising injury clause. For example, the
81.
82.

17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NiMMER, NIMMER ON

COPYRIGHTS,

§ 19C.07[A] (2008).

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016

23

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 2

24

DEPAUL J. ART, TECH & IP LAW

[Vol. XIX: I

Ninth Circuit in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. American Home
Assurance Co. found no coverage under the advertising injury
clause for allegations of copyright infringement involving the right
to produce and market music recordings of a particular artist.83
The copyright infringement claim was based upon an
announcement by the insured that the subject artists would have
new music coming out in the future. 4 The Ninth Circuit found
coverage had not been triggered because the subject artist's new
music was not owned by the insured at the time.85 Therefore,
"[b]ecause the allegation did not concern [the insured's] good,
there was no potential coverage under the 'advertising injury'
clause of the policies." 6 The UMG decision illustrates the fact
that litigants can find ambiguity in the most straightforward policy
language when attempting to establish insurance coverage.
2. Trademark/TradeDress Infringement
As mentioned above, trademark/trade dress infringement is
admittedly intertwined with advertising more than copyright or
patent infringement. The Lanham Act, which codifies common
law trademark infringement, defines trademark as a "word, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof-(1) used by a
person, or (2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in
commerce . . . to identify or distinguish his or her goods.""
Therefore, advertising is essentially an element of trademark/trade
dress infringement because it would be difficult to use a "word,
name, symbol or device" "in commerce" to "distinguish his or her
goods" without advertising.88 While trademark or trade dress
infringement is not always included as an offense under the
83. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., No. 06-56076,
2008 WL 4107315, at *2 (9th Cir. Sept. 2, 2008).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
88. "For insurance for trademark infringement cases to exist, there are
certain basic requirements: (1) the offense must occur in the course of
advertising (or, for the 1998 form, in an advertisement); (2) the offense must
occur in the coverage territory; and (3) the offense must occur during the policy
period." MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 33:6.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/2
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advertising injury clause, some courts have found coverage for
trademark or trade dress infringement under the offense for
"misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing
business."89 Other courts have found trademark or trade dress
infringement under the offense for infringement of title.9"
Without a question, an insured has the greatest chance of
establishing insurance coverage under the advertising injury clause
when the underlying lawsuit is based upon trademark/trade dress
infringement.
However, there are a significant number of
decisions that have weighed the nuances of coverage for
trademark/trade dress infringement differently.
Therefore,
obtaining CGL coverage is not an effective method to protect a
business against allegations of trademark or trade dress
infringement.
3. PatentInfringement Claims
It is well-settled that patent infringement will not typically
trigger coverage under the advertising injury clause. The grant of
a patent is based primarily upon functionality of object.91 There
has been little opposition to the holding that "as a matter of law,
patent infringement cannot occur in the course of an insured's
advertising activities."92 Despite the body of law barring coverage
for patent infringement claims being quite developed, the
advertising injury clause has been found to be sufficiently
ambiguous to allow the argument that patent infringement should
89. See R.C. Bigelow, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 304 F.3d 1179,
1188 (lth Cir. 2002) (holding trade dress infringement constituted
misappropriation of style of doing business).
90. See J.A. Brundage Plumbing & Roto-Rooter, Inc. v. Mass. Bay Ins.
Co., 818 F. Supp. 553, 558 (W.D.N.Y. 1993).
91. "A patent applicant is entitled to a patent only if their invention is
new, adequately disclosed, useful, nonobvious, and fits within statutorily
defined subject matter." See SHELDON W. HALPERN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF
UNITED STATES INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: COPYRIGHT, PATENT AND
TRADEMARK 186 (2d ed. 2006).
92. Simply Fresh Fruit, Inc. v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 94 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th
Cir. 1996); see also Heil Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 937 F. Supp.
1355, 1366 (E.D. Wis. 1996) ("[T]he gravamen of direct infringement of a
patent is making, using, or selling a patented invention not advertising it.").
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trigger coverage under CGL policies.93 "Courts should reject
insurer arguments against the coverage of patent infringement
lawsuits. According to the Nebraska Supreme Court in Union
Insurance Co. v. Land & Sky, Inc., an insurer should defend patent
infringement inducement when the insured's advertising is an
element of the offense. 94
In a nutshell, it would not be recommended for a business to
obtain CGL coverage with the intention of protecting itself from
patent infringement claims.
III. THE ONLY METHOD To PROTECTING VALUABLE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INSURANCE TAILORED FOR
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAIMS

This article is in no way advocating that businesses consider
foregoing CGL coverage. Of course, CGL coverage is essential to
protect every business, large or small, regardless of its products or
services. Without question, CGL coverage is the only method a
business can be confident it is protected against claims constituting
bodily injury, property damage or advertising and personal injury.
In addition to coverage provided by CGL policies, a business that
has extensive intellectual property assets should obtain coverage
that will unambiguously protect intellectual property, irrespective
of whether the claims for coverage are related to the insured's
"advertising activities." That is, coverage under intellectual
property policies are not conditioned upon the insured's
competitor making allegations that sufficiently assert advertising
in order for the insured to trigger coverage for infringement
claims. More importantly, more recent versions of CGL policies
expressly exclude claims related to intellectual property. A
business that is not being distracted by questions related to
insurance coverage can focus on innovation rather than litigation.
Recent steps taken by Microsoft illustrate the need to protect
against risk while developing innovative products. Recognizing
that innovation and litigation are unfortunately often intertwined,
93. See generally David A. Gauntlett, Patents and Insurance: Who Will
Payfor Reimbursement, 4 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 6 (1998).
94. Id. at 24 (citing Union Ins. Co. v. Land & Sky, Inc., 529 N.W.2d 773,
778 (Neb. 1995)).
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Microsoft has offered to "shield partner companies from exposure
to legal costs and damage claims related to patent or other
intellectual property disputes."95 Practically speaking, Microsoft's
offer to indemnify its partners is equivalent to, and functions as
insurance against infringement claims. Microsoft may be ahead of
the curve by allowing its contractors to innovate rather than
focusing on protecting the fruits of innovation.
There is no dispute that litigation related to intellectual property
claims can be costly. Surveys conducted by the American
Intellectual Property Law Association have found litigation costs
for patent infringement suits can exceed $5 million, trademark
infringement suits can exceed $1.5 million and copyright
infringement suits can exceed $1.2 million.96 The Intellectual
Property Insurance Services Corporation ("IPISC") reported that
the American Intellectual Property Law Association bi-annual
survey found the following litigation costs related to infringement
actions:97

95. See Press Release, Microsoft, Microsoft Strengthens Intellectual
Property Protections for Partners, (June 22, 2005), available at
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2005/jun05/0622PartnerlndemnificationPR.mspx.
96. See Intellectual Property Insurance Services: AIPLA Survey,
www.ipisc.com/iprisk/aipla-survey/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2009).
97. The IPISC provides the following information related to these
calculations:
[These calculations] are the mean (average) costs of
litigation reported for patent, trademark and
copyright infringement. These costs are based upon
three categories of amounts at risk, and are presented
as of two stages of a suit - through the discovery
period and inclusive of discovery, motions, hearing
and post-hearing. The costs consist of outside as well
as local counsel, associates and paralegal services,
travel and living expenses, fees and costs for court
reporters, copies, couriers, exhibit preparation,
analytical testing, expert witnesses, translators,
surveys, jury advisors, and similar expenses. Awards
and damages are not included in the results.
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Patent Infringement Litigation98
At Less Than $1 $1 Million to Greater
$25 Million
Than
$25
Million

Amount
Risk

Million

Discovery
Complete
All Costs

$461,000
$767,000

Approx.
Million
Approx.
Million

$1.5
$2.6

Approx. $3.3
Million
Approx. $5.5
Million

Trademark Infringement Litigation99
Amount
At Less Than $1 $1 Million to Greater
Million
$25 Million
Than
$25
Risk
Million
$437,000
$868,000
Discovery
$184,000
Complete
Approx. $1.5
All Costs
$327,000
$790,000
Million

Copyright Infringement Litigation '°
At Less Than $1 $1 Million to Greater
Amount
Than
$25
Risk
Million
$25 Million
Million
$838,000
Discovery
$179,000
$435,000
Complete
Approx. $1.3
$310,000
$749,000
All Costs
Million

Recognizing litigation costs could take a toll on innovation and
the development of technology that was intrinsically valuable,
insurers began to issue "specialty policies for intellectual property
disputes" in the mid-1990's."l The market for specialty insurance
coverage for intellectual property claims has been traced to two

Id.
NIMMER,

supra note 82, § 19C.10.
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main factors: the ambiguity related to CGL coverage for
intellectual property assets and growth in the number of potential
consumers for intellectual property insurance.
First, based upon the conflicting body of law related to the
advertising injury clause and recent exclusions for intellectual
property claims, businesses have started to realize that CGL
coverage may not be appropriate for all their needs. And,
insurance carriers have been increasingly stepping in to fill this
void of coverage for intellectual property assets. For example, the
IPISC has made available certain coverage and a number of
insurance companies have started to write coverage for intellectual
property claims." 2 Specifically, the IPISC has stated the purpose
of intellectual property insurance is to "align the interest of the
insured with the interests of the insurance carrier" by providing
"the optimum outcome from litigation with minimal interruption to
business and operations" with as little cost as possible. 03
Additionally, this recent development of insurance coverage for
intellectual property is attributable to simple economics; that is,
the market has recently grown larger for specialty policies for
intellectual property.'04 Unlike coverage under CGL policies that
would arguably provides defense and indemnity for infringement
against the insured, there are may insurance products developing
covering more than a defense for infringement. Indeed, insurance
policies for intellectual property claims is typically divided into
three types of coverages: defense and indemnity; defense only; and
offensive policy. Each type of coverage will be discussed in turn.
A.

Multi-PerilPolicy

The IPISC provides coverage forms for "Multi-Peril" policies
covering intellectual property infringement that will reimburse the
insured for certain losses identified as "loss of commercial
advantage," "business interruption" or "other liquidated
102.
103.

§ 33:20.
See Intellectual Property Insurance Services: Products & Services,
MCCARTHY, supra note 8,

www.ipisc.com/products/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2009).
104. See MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 33:20 ("The second factor fostering
the development of specialty products was an excess capacity in the insurance
market place during the 1990s.")
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damages."" 5 The purpose of this coverage is stated by the IPISC
as: for "any company or individual with an insurable interest in
their intellectual capital. The policy provides coverage for losses
incurred as a result of an unsuccessful attempt to defend or enforce
in an IP infringement suit."'0 6 While Multi-Peril policies are
routine in the insurance industry, Multi-Peril policies for
intellectual property assets are a recent development. The IPISC
released the Multi-Peril Intellectual Property Reimbursement
Policy in early 2008.107 In fact, as of the time of writing this, there
are no published decisions related to coverage under Multi-Peril
policies for intellectual property.
Specifically, the Insuring Agreement of a Multi-Peril insurance
policies provide for losses resulting from a LOSS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY VALUE0 8 caused by specified
"PERIL" directly caused by an ADVERSE HAPPENING. That is,
to establish coverage the insured must show the alleged loss was
from a specifically named peril. "By contrast, liability insurance
policies insure something intangible, e.g., the risk of liability that
the insured may be sued for injuries arising out of certain types of
conduct. Liability policies do not insure against the happening of
property damage or bodily injury per se but rather insure against
the risk of the insured being held liable for such injuries."'0 9 The
Multi-Peril Policy provides an advantage over CGL coverage for
intellectual property assets to the extent that coverage can be
tailored to the specific needs of the insured.
First, the typical Multi-Peril policy defines "ADVERSE
HAPPENING" as one of the following: a preliminary injunction;
the "invalidation of a patent, trademark or copyright;" "loss of
civil proceedings;". "unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets;"
105. See GAUNTLETT, supra note 14, § 20.04(C).
106. See Intellectual Property Insurance Services: Multi-Peril
Reimbursement
Insurance,
http://www.ipisc.com/products/insurancepolicies/multi-peril/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2009).
107. See IP OBSERVER (Intellectual Prop. Ins. Servs. Corp., Louisville,
Ky.), Feb. 29, 2008.
108. "Loss of intellectual property" is defined in a Multi-Peril policy as:
"business income, profits, royalties or Declared Value." Multi-Peril Intellectual
Property Reimbursement Insurance Policy, (Form 03012008) (1991-2008) at
II(V) [hereinafter Multi-Peril Policy].
109.

APPLEMAN, supra note 13, § 3.09[2][a].
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"loss of an interference proceeding;". "wrongful termination,
abandonment or suspension of performance of license;". "nonappealable finding of inequitable conduct or patent misuse;" or
"loss of commercial advantage because of the use of the HatchWaxman Act."" 0
Second, a Multi-Peril policy will only be triggered by what is
referred to as a NAMED PERIL, which are defined to include the
following:
1.BUSINESS INTERRUPTION shall mean the
provable loss of business income directly caused by
the ADVERSE HAPPENING...

2.LOSS OF COMMERCIAL ADVANTAGE shall
mean the provable loss of business income directly
caused by a non-appealable adverse holding or
declaration of the ADVERSE HAPPENING.
.INVALIDATION of a PATENT, TRADEMARK
or COPYRIGHT...

3.LOSS OF TRADE DRESS IDENTITY shall
mean the provable loss of business income directly
caused by the LOSS OF CIVIL PROCEEDING...

4.LOSS OF TRADE SECRET ADVANTAGE
shall mean the provable loss of business income
directly caused by the ADVERSE HAPPENING..
.UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE of TRADE
SECRETS...

110. Multi-Peril Policy, supra note 108, at 11(a).
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5.LOSS OF ONGOING ROYALTIES/LICENSE
FEES shall mean provable loss of royalties being
of
COVERED
under
a
license
paid
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY...

6.LOSS OF BENEFIT OF RESEARCH &
DEVELOPMENT shall mean the loss of research
and development investment resulting from: a. A
PATENT being declared INVALID; or b. Loss of
an INTERFERENCE PROCEEDING filed against
c. A NON-APPEALABLE
a PATENT(s);
FINDING OF INEQUITABLE CONDUCT OR
PATENT MISUSE vis-A-vis a PATENT; or, d.
COMMERCIAL
ADVANTAGE
LOSS
OF
BECAUSE OF THE USE OF THE HATCHWAXMAN ACT.

OF
COVERED
INTELLECTUAL
7.LOSS
PROPERTY PORTFOLIO VALUE shall be
deemed to have occurred but only if directly caused
by any one of the following ADVERSE
a. INVALIDATION OF A
HAPPENINGS:
PATENT, TRADEMARK, OR COPYRIGHT.. ..b.
LOSS OF INTERFERENCE PROCEEDING.. .c.
OF
FINDING
NON-APPEALABLE
PATENT
CONDUCT
OR
INEQUITABLE
MISUSE....
8.COST OF REDESIGN, REMEDIATION AND
REPARATION shall mean the actual cost of
redesigning, retooling or disposal of INFRINGING
MANUFACTURED PRODUCT(S) MARKS AND
WORKS; shipping and restocking with NON
MANUFACTURED
INFRINGING
PRODUCT(S), MARKS, AND WORKS; renaming
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/2
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and/or redecorating of business premises; and
rebuilding the goodwill of distributors, retailers and
customers which above activities are directly
necessitated and caused by: a. INVALIDATION of
a PATENT, TRADEMARK OR COPYRIGHT..
.b. LOSS OF CIVIL PROCEEDING(S).. .c. LOSS
OF AN INTERFERENCE PROCEEDING.. .or d.
NON-APPEALABLE
FINDING
OF
INEQUITABLE
CONDUCT
OR PATENT
MISUSE...
There is virtually no authority interpreting the policy language
or the mechanics of Multi-Peril insurance for intellectual property
claims. As a general matter, courts have described multi-peril
policies as those that "an insurer specifies the perils it will cover
and the policyholder bears the risk of any unknown or unforeseen
cause of damage." 11' The limited number of decisions concerning
this insurance coverage may be attributable to the fact that there is
little room for interpretation of the policy language," 2 a reluctance
by insurance carriers to write this coverage, a reluctance of
policyholders to purchase this coverage or a combination of all
three.

1

3

111. See United Techs. Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 989 F. Supp.
128, 142 (D. Conn. 1997).
112. It is a well-settled principle in insurance law that
[a] provision in an insurance policy is ambiguous if it
is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.
Nonetheless, courts will not create an ambiguity
where none exists; if a provision is clear and
unambiguous there is no need for construction and
the provisions will be applied as written.
In
determining whether an ambiguity exists, the
provision in question must be read in its factual
context, not in isolation. All the provisions of the
insurance contract, rather than an isolated part,
should be read together to interpret it and to
determine whether an ambiguity exists.
See Transamerica Ins. Co. v. South, 975 F.2d 321, 327 (7th Cir. 1992) (citations
omitted).
113. Multi-Peril coverage is analyzed to a great extent for property
damage. For example, the Fifth Circuit has been called upon to determine
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B. Abatement Policy
A market has developed for insurance designed to reimburse the
insured for expenses arising from the enforcement of intellectual
property rights. This coverage is commonly referred to as "pursuit
coverage" because it "is designed to cover the costs of pursuing
'
plaintiff-side actions."114
"Intellectual Property Infringement
Abatement Insurance" provides coverage for "[c]laims for
reimbursement that are first made by the Named Insured to the
Company during the Policy Period for Litigation Expense for
'
Authorized Litigation."115
The Insuring Agreement of this claimsmade policy provides the insurer will indemnify the insured for
certain expenses related to litigation brought by the insured for the
"INFRINGEMENT, or the manufacture, use, sale, offer for sale by
a person other than the Named Insured or a licensee of the process,
'
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter or articles."116
This "enforcement" coverage is limited to the infringement of the
Named Insured's patents, trademarks or copyrights that the Named
Insured "represents to the best of its knowledge and belief were
legally and/or are being legally procured and as to which the
Named Insured warrants it has no knowledge of any facts or
circumstances adversely affecting their validity."" 7 Under this
coverage the Named Insured will have coverage for all
"AUTHORIZED LITIGATION" or as that term is defined,
coverage for "A Civil Proceeding ...before an Arbitration Panel

or in a United States Federal District Court or United States
appellate court alleging INFRINGEMENT of the INSURED
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY by one or more parties.""' 8 The
process to obtain authorization typically can be closely scrutinized

whether Hurricane Katrina triggered an insurance policy providing coverage for
a "windstorm." Broussard v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 523 F. 3d 618, 625-26
(5th Cir. 2008).
114. NIMMER, supra note 82, § 19C.10[A].
115. See, e.g., Intellectual Property Infringement Abatement Insurance
Policy (2000-032300) (1991, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000) [hereinafter IP
Abatement Policy].
116. See id. at § I(a)(2).
117. See id. at § II(B), definition of "Insured Intellectual Property."
118. See id. at § II(G), definition of "Authorized Litigation."
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/2
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by insurers"' "and almost always requires an opinion letter from
counsel, often pre-approved by the insurer." 120
The Abatement policy has a unique Condition requiring the
allocation between the insurer and the insured of any monetary
damages received by the insured. This allocation would be made
of any amounts constituting "ECONOMIC BENEFIT" as defined
in the policy. Economic Benefit is defined as:
[t]he greater of the cash value, the present value, or
the fair market value of all consideration received
in satisfaction of a judgment, settlement, or
compromise of AUTHORIZED LITIGATION
including but not limited to securities, property
(real, personal, tangible, or intangible), and all other
property, or legal or financial rights of whatever
nature including but not limited to those which may
result in the potential for increased market share.
Where a value cannot be objectively measured,
ECONOMIC BENEFIT shall be presumed to be
1.25 times the Company's total indemnification
payments with respect to the AUTHORIZED
LITIGATION.

121

Typically, insurance policies are not offensive in nature and
therefore do not have provisions that permit the insurer and the
insured split amounts recovered in litigation. The Abatement
Policy potentially indemnifies the insured for the prosecution
119.

To meet this condition and insured is expected to submit:
a comprehensive overview of the claim, discussion of
the discovery and history of the infringement,
projection of costs pf the infringement over the
remaining life of the property, evaluation of the
prospects for success, comparison of the respective
property of the insured and the alleged infringer,
proposed court and counsel, litigation budget, and an
opinion letter from independent patent counsel.
MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 33:23.
120. NIMMER, supra note 82, § 19C.10[A][1].
121. See IP Abatement Policy, supra note 115, § II(K), definition of
"Economic Benefit."
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against an infringing party. Consequently, the Abatement policy
provides that any time the Named Insured receives an
ECONOMIC BENEFIT that "such recovery shall be shared
between the Company and the Named Insured pro rata in
proportion to their respective contributions to" the prosecution of
the infringement claim. '22
From a practical standpoint,
commentators have stated that while the Economic Benefit
condition makes coverage affordable,'23 this condition may "act as
an incentive for insurers to the extent that they must authorize
actions, to only allow the most promising cases go to trial." '24 The
Abatement policy further provides that any ECONOMIC
BENEFIT received by the Company shall be used to "reinstate"
the Policy Limits used to prosecute the infringement action.'25
The IPISC states the advantages for abatement insurance
include:
*

To strengthen the owners negotiation position
and licensability of intellectual properties;

*

To provide enough funds to support a strong
legal front, thereby increasing the likelihood of
a favorable outcome;

*

To make funds available when necessary, rather
than utilize operating capital or attempt
financing; [and]

" To limit the risk of unsuccessful litigation

122. See id. at § III(D).
123. The IPISC provides the following cost estimations for this coverage:
"Premiums are calculated based on the number of insured IP and their relative
risk. One patent, of average risk, at $1 million in limits, is approximately $7000
- $9000 annual premium. Our average Abatement policy, regardless of limits
and number of IP, is about $13,000." Intellectual Property Insurance Services:
IP
Abatement
Insurance,
http://www.ipisc.com/products/insurancepolicies/abatement (last visited Jan. 14, 2009).
124. NIMMER, supra note 82, § 19C.10[A][1].
125. See IP Abatement Policy, supra note 115, § III(D)(5).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/2
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through more informed decision-making. 126
There is scant law addressing the parameters of coverage under
Abatement policies. Indeed, there are no significant decisions
related to Abatement policies in state or federal courts. The
decision in In re Cleveland v. Department of Insurance of the State
of New York, 127 provides one of the few examples of a published
decision even remotely concerning an Abatement policy. The
decision in Cleveland sheds light on the difficulties in obtaining
this coverage rather than providing any guidance whatsoever
concerning coverage under Abatement policies. The appellate
court reviewed a decision by the Department of Insurance of the
State of New York that Cleveland, an excess-lines insurance
broker, did not have the authority to place a patent infringement
insurance policy in New York.'28
The appellate court's decision in Cleveland was based upon its
finding that, first, Cleveland did not have the proper licensing to
issue claims-made coverage. Secondly, the appellate court found a
patent infringement insurance policy was obtainable under New
York law. In finding this type of coverage was impermissible
under New York law, the Appellate Court opined:
In an attempt to force the subject policy into the
definition of "burglary and theft insurance,"
petitioner urges that infringement of a patent is a
form of conversion. Whether this is true or not, it
ignores the part of that definition which limits
burglary and theft insurance to policies that insure
against "loss of or damage to" the property insured.
Respondents correctly note that even if a patent, or
the rights it confers upon its owner, could be
considered to be lost or damaged when infringed
upon, the policy in question does not provide the
indemnification for damages occasioned by the loss
126.

Intellectual Property Insurance Services: IP Abatement Insurance,

www.ipisc.com/products/insurance-policies/abatement/
2009).
127. 614 N.Y.S.2d 620 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)
128. See id. at 620-21.
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of these rights, or for the loss of profits that may
result. Rather than indemnifying for the loss of
property, the policy simply provides for payment of
litigation expenses arising out of certain litigation
commenced by the named insured. As it was not
unreasonable for the Superintendent to conclude
that the insurance was not authorized by [New York
law], this aspect of the Superintendent's
determination is upheld. 129

C. Defense Coverage ForIntellectual Property
Defense policies provide reimbursement for litigation expenses
and damages for which the insured is liable and has paid to a third
party arising out of covered litigation."130 "A standard coverage
grant in a defense policy reads: 'We will pay those sums that the
insured becomes legally obligated to pay as 'damages' because of
'intellectual property' liability"""' The IPISC summarizes this
coverage as insurance that "provides the funds to fight the legal
battle when [an insured] is accused of IP infringement." '
Specifically, the IPISC states intellectual property defense
coverage may provide the following benefits: provides resources
to defend infringement actions against insured; demonstrates
"Insured's ability to financially protect their business practices;"
and offers protection to shareholders. 133
The intellectual property defense policy provides coverage for
infringement claims against the insured. Essentially, defense
policies unequivocally provide coverage for claims regardless of
the insured's advertising activities. Consequently, this coverage is
better suited for intellectual property assets than the coverage
129. See id. at 621-22.
130. Janik, supra note 6, at 199.
131.
MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 33:21.
132. See Intellectual Property Insurance Services: IP Defense Insurance,
www.ipisc.com/products/insurance-policies/defense/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2009).
133. See IPisc Product of the Month: IP Infringement Defense Insurance
Policy, IP OBSERVER (Intellectual Prop. Ins. Servs. Corp., Louisville, Ky.), July
31,
2008, available at www.central-insurex.com/VolllssuelII_07-302008(4).pdf.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/2
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provided by the advertising injury clause because there is no
advertising requirement to trigger coverage.
Unlike the underwriting process for CGL coverage, the
underwriting process for defense policies involves an analysis of
the exact intellectual property asset in which coverage is to be
obtained. "' From that point forward, premiums for this claimsmade coverage reflect the risk associated with the product based
upon the prevalence of the product in the marketplace.135 The
IPISC estimates the premium for "[o]ne product/function, of
average risk at $1 million in limits, is approximately $12,000 [to]
$16,000, depending on inclusion of damages in the coverage. "136
Therefore, an insured can specifically list its particular trade dress
that it seeks coverage and, there will be coverage should that
insured ever be sued for infringement. It would be unnecessary to
demonstrate the insured's advertisements used the trade dress in a
manner that would trigger coverage under the advertising injury
clause.
IV. CONCLUSION

Businesses have obtained insurance coverage for bodily injury,
property damage and personal and advertising injury through CGL
policies for decades. CGL coverage functions best as general
liability coverage and therefore, is essential for the general needs
of virtually every business. Importantly, this article is not
advocating that every business needs intellectual property. Rather,
it is only important that a business with significant intellectual
property assets compliment its general liability coverage with
intellectual property coverage. Intellectual property insurance is a
necessity as present-day CGL policies are including express
exclusions
barring
coverage
for intellectual
property.
Additionally, a business should not risk having to establish the
causal nexus between its advertising and assertions of
infringement while simultaneously defending itself against the
134. Intellectual Property Insurance Services: IP Defense Insurance,
http://www.ipisc.com/products/insurance-policies/defense/ (last visited Jan. 14,
2009).
135. See id.
136. See id.
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assertions of infringement. Rather, the market for intellectual
property insurance has developed to allow a business to focus on
innovation rather than wasting resources protecting its innovation.
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